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In this paper, an algebraic binning based coding scheme and
its associated achievable rate for key generation using physically
unclonable functions (PUFs) is determined. This achievable rate
is shown to be optimal under the generated-secret (GS) model
for PUFs. Furthermore, a polar code based polynomial-time
encoding and decoding scheme that achieves this rate is also
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) form a promising
innovative primitive that are increasingly gaining traction in
the domains of authentication and secret key storage [1]–[3].
Instead of storing secrets in digital memory, PUFs derive a
secret from the physical characteristics of an integrated circuit
(IC) that form an inherent part of the device. Such a PUF
can be obtained, as even though the mask and manufacturing
process is relatively similar among ICs built for a particular
purpose, each IC is actually unique due to normal manufac-
turing variability.
This unique behavior after manufacturing stems from a
static randomness due to technological dispersion. This static
randomness was characterized by Pelgrom [4], and is known
to follow a normal distribution. Unfortunately, PUF outputs
are also subject to dynamic randomness due to measurement
noise, which is detrimental to the reliability of a PUF as a
source for cryptographic elements.
In this paper, we understand the information theoretic limits
of key generation using PUFs, given this static and dynamic
randomness in the system. As discussed in [1], [2], one of the
central use-cases for PUFs is secret key generation, where this
key is subsequently utilized in a variety of cryptographic algo-
rithms. A higher key generation rate implies greater security
guarantees for the overall system, and therefore, our focus is
to understand its limits, and to characterize coding schemes
that approach these limits.
A. Related Work and Our Contributions
There is already a considerable body of work on combining
PUFs with error correction coding schemes to obtain reliable
keys or secrets [3]. Conventionally, these have combined
BCH/RS codes with PUFs. More recently, [8] presents simu-
lation results on the combination of a polar code with a PUF,
setting the stage for such a combination to be understood
analytically. In parallel work to this paper, the authors et al. [9]
uncover the connection between PUF key generation problem
and Wyner-Ziv problem [15]. And they study a nested polar
codes construction scheme based on [10].
In this work, we present a PUF key generation scheme
based on a previously well studied model called generated-
secret (GS) model. In [6], the authors present the region of
achievable secret-key vs. privacy-leakage (key vs. leakage)
rates for the GS model. In this paper, we show that the optimal
key generation rate is achievable using algebraic binning with
linear codes, and uncover the relation between PUF key
generation problem and Slepian-Wolf problem. Further, we
present encoding and decoding algorithms using polar codes
that achieve the optimal rate. Finally, we present simulation
results to showcase the performance of our scheme.
Compared to existing literature, we find that our scheme
results in a relatively straightforward interpretation of the PUF
key generation problem, and results in a key generation rate
that is optimal for the GS model for PUFs. This is further
expanded on in later sections of the paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides the system model for PUF and formally
defines the problem. Section III shows the algebraic binning
method and polar code construction achieving the maximal
key generation rate. Section IV compares our method to the
existing other methods. Section V presents the simulation
result. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and gives future
directions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Upper case letters represent random variables and lower
case letters their realizations. A superscript denotes a vector of
variables, e.g., Xn = X1, X2, . . . , Xn, and a subscript denotes
the position of a variable in a vector. Calligraphic letters such
as X denote sets, and set sizes are written as ‖X‖. Hb(x) =
−x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy function.
The ∗-operator is defined as p ∗x = p(1−x) + (1− p)x. The
operator ⊕ represents the element-wise modulo-2 summation.
A binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability
p is denoted by BSC(p). Qb(X) represents a binary quantizer
that quantizes X > 0 to 1 and X < 0 to 0.
A physically unclonable function (PUF) can be mathemat-
ically represented fairly simply as
Y˜ = X˜ + Z˜,
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where Y˜ is the PUF output, X˜ ∼ N (0, P ) is the static
randomness and Z˜ ∼ N (0, N) the dynamic randomness
independent of X . As stated earlier in the introduction, X˜
is the desired “signal", which is corrupted by the “noise” Z˜
when observed at the output of a PUF.
In most conventional systems today, the PUF output is quan-
tized immediately after observation. Most models in literature
assume the output passes through a binary quantizer Qb(·).
It can be easily shown that Qb(Y˜ ), Qb(X˜) are distributed
as Bernoulli(0.5), and Qb(Y˜ ) = Qb(X˜) ⊕ Z ′, where Z ′ is
independent of Qb(X˜), distributed as Bernoulli(p), where p is
a function of P and N . From now on, we use Y to represent
Qb(Y˜ ), X to represent Qb(X˜) and Z to represent Z ′. Thus
we have our PUF model with binary quantization as
Y = X ⊕ Z, (1)
where Y is the PUF output, X ∼ Bernoulli(0.5) and Z ∼
Bernoulli(p). Note that from the nature of PUF we do not
have access to X . Indeed, in the real world applications, both
Y and X are PUF outputs, which gives a different crossover
probability p∗p in the model. But since it does not change the
model (BSC), in the remaining part of this paper, we abuse the
notations that we stick to the above model while both Y and
X represent PUF outputs and p is the parameter that measures
the noise between two PUF outputs.
As mentioned earlier, we follow the generated-secret (GS)
model for key generation of PUFs, as depicted in Figure 1.
For a given sequence Xn, our task is to design an encoder
φ : Fn2 :→ (Fn−k2 ,Fk2) that generates a helper sequence Sn−k
and a key W k and a decoder ψ : Fn2 × Fn−k2 :→ Fk2 that au-
thenticates the key. This is such that, for a particular PUF, the
probability of successful authentication goes to 1 as n goes to
infinity. Let (Sn−k,W k) = φ(Xn) and Wˆ k = ψ(Y n, Sn−k),
Pr(Wˆ k 6= W k)→ 0 as n→∞.
Define the key generation rate as R = k/n, we desire to
determine the maximal key generation rate
max
φ,ψ
R s.t. Pr(Wˆ k 6= W k)→ 0. (2)
III. PUF SYSTEM DESIGN USING POLAR CODES
In this section, we first state our main theorem and show
the optimal key generation rate is achievable with algebraic
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Fig. 1. The GS model for PUF key generation system
binning using linear codes. Note that, the result can also be ob-
tained by random binning, but algebraic binning offers greater
insights for PUF key generation system design. Therefore, we
choose to use an algebraic binning framework going forward.
A. Algebraic Binning Using Linear Codes
Theorem 1. Given a PUF and an associated key generation
rate R < I(X;Y ), there exists a linear code such that
Pr(Wˆ k 6= W k)→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. The basic idea is to generate the bins as the cosets of
a “good" parity-check code. Let an (n, k) binary parity check
code specified by the (n− k)× n binary parity-check matrix
H . The code C = {cn} contains all n-length binary vectors
cn whose syndrome sn−k , Hcn is equal to zero, where here
multiplication and addition are modulo 2. Assuming that all
rows of H are linearly independent, there are 2k codewords in
C, so the code rate is (log |C|)/n = k/n. Given some general
syndrome sn−k ∈ {0, 1}n−k, the set of all n-length vectors xn
satisfying Hxn = sn−k is called a coset Cs. Define a decoding
function f(sn−k), where f : {0, 1}n−k → {0, 1}n, is equal
to the vector vn ∈ Cs with the minimum Hamming weight,
where ties are broken evenly. It follows from linearity that the
coset is a shift of the code C by the vector vn, i.e.,
Cs , {xn : Hxn = sn−k} = {cn ⊕ vn : cn ∈ C} , Cv,
where the n-length vector vn = f(sn−k) is the coset leader.
Decoding of this parity-check code amounts to quantizing
yn to the nearest vector in C with respect to the Hamming
distance. This vector, xˆn, can be computed by syndrome
decoding using the function f
xˆn = yn ⊕ zˆn, zˆn = f(Hyn) = yn mod C. (3)
We may view the decoder above as a partition of {0, 1}n to 2k
decision cells of size 2n−k each, which are all shifted versions
of the basic “Voronoi” set
{zn : zn ⊕ f(Hzn) = 0} , Ω0.
Each of the 2n−k members of Ω0 is a coset leader for a
different coset. The enrollment and authentication procedures
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Fig. 2. The GS model for PUF key generation system with algebraic binning
with this algebraic binning are summarized in Algorithm 1.
And the corresponding system model is shown in Figure 2.
Since our PUF model Y = X ⊕Z is a BSC with crossover
probability p. We are interested in “good" parity check codes
over BSC(p) that are capacity achieving, i.e., they have a rate
R arbitrarily close to 1−H(p) for n large enough. Note that
H(X|Y ) = H(p) and H(X) = 1, together with Algorithm 1
will grant us the desired result.
Algorithm 1 Algebraic Binning
procedure ENROLLMENT(xn)
Store the syndrome sn−k = Hxn as helper data.
end procedure
procedure AUTHENTICATION(yn, sn−k)
Find the coset leader vn = f(sn−k).
Find the error between yn and the coset Cs
zˆn = (vn ⊕ yn) mod C.
Reconstruct the key wˆk = yn ⊕ zˆn ⊕ vn.
end procedure
First, we show for any enrollment sequence xn and the
corresponding PUF output yn, the block error probability
is vanishingly small. Note that the decoding computation in
Algorithm 1 is unique, so unlike in random binning we never
have ambiguous decoding. Hence, noting from the PUF model
zn = xn ⊕ yn and from (3) that zˆn = f(H(xn ⊕ yn)) =
f(Hzn), a decoding error event amounts to {wˆk 6= wk} ↔
{xˆn 6= xn} ↔ {zˆn 6= zn} so the probability of decoding error
is
Pr{Wˆ k 6= W k} = Pr{Xˆn 6= Xn} = Pr{f(HZn) 6= Zn}
which by good BSC(p) code is smaller than .
Next, we show the optimal rate is I(X;Y ). Because the
total number of typical sequences are 2nH(X), maximizing the
key generation rate R is equivalent to minimize the number
of bins (cosets)
maxR = max
k
n
= max 1− n− k
n
. (4)
Here we need the following Slepian-Wolf bound for dis-
tributed source coding.
Theorem 2 (Slepian-Wolf [5]). For the distributed source
coding problem for the source (X,Y ) drawn i.i.d.∼ p(x, y),
the achievable rate region is given by
R1 ≥ H(X|Y ),
R2 ≥ H(Y |X),
R1 +R2 ≥ H(X,Y ).
To establish the connection between GS model and Slepian-
Wolf problem, we see the two PUF outputs X and Y are the
correlated source for Slepian-Wolf problem, and the number
of bins in GS model is equivalent to the rate of the first source
in Slepian-Wolf problem
n− k
n
= R1 ≥ H(X|Y ). (5)
Combing Equ.(4) and (5), we have the optimal rate as 1 −
H(X|Y ) = H(X) −H(X|Y ) = I(X;Y ). The optimality is
guaranteed by the Slepian-Wolf bound.
Remark 1. The proof shows the key generation rate I(X;Y )
is achievable with a “good” coset partition, in a sense that
each coset is a “good” parity check code over BSC(p). It is a
general statement, as long as one can find the “good” coset
partition with each coset a “good” parity check code for some
channel, the key generation rate I(X;Y ) is achievable for that
channel.
B. Polar Codes for PUFs
Polar codes are popular linear block codes, introduced
by Arikan in [7]. A binary polar code can be specified by
(N,K,F , uF ), where N = 2n is the block length, K is the
number of information bits encoded per codeword, F is the
set of indices of the N −K frozen bits and uF is a vector of
frozen bits, which is known to both encoder and decoder.
1) Encoding of Polar Codes: For an (N,K,F , uF ) polar
code, the encoding operation for a message vector uN , is
performed using a generator matrix,
GN = BNG
⊗ logN
2 ,
where BN is a bit-reversal permutation matrix, G2 =
[
1 0
1 1
]
and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
Given a message vector uN , the codewords are generated
as
xN = uF
c
(GN )Fc ⊕ uF (GN )F ,
where Fc , {1, 2, . . . , N}\F corresponds to the information
bits indices. So uF
c
are the information bits and uF are the
frozen bits.
2) Decoding of Polar Codes: Polar codes achieve the
channel capacity asymptotically in code length, when decod-
ing is done using the successive-cancellation (SC) decoding
algorithm. The SC decoder observes (yN , uF ) and generates
an estimate uˆN of uN . The ith bit of the estimate uˆN depends
on the channel output yN and the previous bit decisions
uˆ1, uˆ2, . . . , uˆi−1, denoted by uˆi−1. It uses the following deci-
sion rules,
uˆi =

ui if i ∈ F
0 if i ∈ Fc and L(i)(yN , uˆi−1) ≥ 1
l if i ∈ Fc and L(i)(yN , uˆi−1) < 1
where L(i)N (y
N , uˆi−1) = P(yN , uˆi−1|0)/P(yN , uˆi−1|1) is the
ith likelihood ratio (LR) at length N . We omit further details
in SC decoding for limited space, readers can get the full
knowledge of SC decoding in [7].
C. Applying Polar Codes to PUFs
Given the PUF model as a BSC(p), block length N and rate
K/N , we have the polar code with parameters (N,K,F). And
the algebraic binning with polar code is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Algebraic Binning with Polar Code Construction
procedure ENROLLMENT(xN , (N,K,F))
Store the syndrome sN−K = ((GTN )
−1xN )F as helper
data.
end procedure
procedure AUTHENTICATION(yN , sN−K , (N,K,F))
Reconstruct the key wˆK = SCdec(yn, sN−K).
end procedure
Theorem 3. For PUF, every key generation rate R <
I(X;Y ), there exist a polar encoder and decoder, such that∑
sN−K∈XN−K
1
2N−K
∑
wK∈XK
1
2K
Pr(wˆK 6= wK) = O(N− 14 ).
(6)
Proof. As introduced in [7], polar code can be represented as
xN = uF
c
(GN )Fc ⊕ uF (GN )F
= wK(GN )Fc ⊕ sN−K(GN )F .
By inversion of GN , we have the syndrome and the key as
sN−K = ((GTN )
−1xN )F ,
wK = ((GTN )
−1xN )Fc .
Now for each PUF observation xN , we treat it as a codeword
of polar code with parameters (N,K,F , sN−K). So we use
a set of polar code C = {C(N,K,F , sN−K) : sN−K ∈
FN−K2 }. Because GN has full rank, for any xN ∈ FN2 ,
xN ∈ C, and C ⊆ FN2 . So C = FN2 . We proved that C is a
coset partition of FN2 and each coset code C(N,K,F , sN−K)
with coset leader sN−K is a channel code for the channel.
According to the Theorem 3 in [7], we have for rate R <
I(X;Y ), the block error probability for polar coding under
successive cancellation decoding satisfies∑
sN−K∈FN−K2
1
2N−K
∑
wK∈FK2
1
2K
Pr(wˆK 6= wK) = O(N− 14 ).
Although polar codes cannot guarantee each coset code is a
good channel code such that
Pr(WˆK 6= WK) = o(1),
on average, we obtain a good coset partition as required by
Theorem 1.
D. Achievable Scheme for Unquantized PUFs: The Gaussian
Case
As mentioned earlier, a vast majority of PUF outputs are
quantized to a binary alphabet right after generation. However,
for the unquantized PUF model Y˜ = X˜ + Z˜ (again, we abuse
the notations such that Y˜ , X˜ are outputs of the PUF), we use
a lattice based coding scheme as below.
Definitions: Lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of Rn. Quanti-
zation with respect to Λ is QΛ(x˜n) = arg minλ∈Λ ‖x˜n − λ‖.
Fundamental Voronoi region of Λ is V(Λ) = {x˜n : QΛ(x˜n) =
0}. Volume of the Voronoi region of Λ is V (Λ) = ∫V(Λ) dx˜n.
Normalized second moment of Λ is G(Λ) = σ
2(Λ)
V (Λ)2/n
where
σ2(Λ) = 1nV (Λ)
∫
V(Λ) ‖x˜n‖2dx˜n. A pair of Lattices (Λ,Λ0)
are said to be nested if Λ ⊆ Λ0.
We use nested lattices Λ ⊆ Λ0 for coset partitioning and
algebraic binning. The encoder block with input x˜n and output
d˜n is implemented by lattice modulo operation
d˜n = [x˜n] mod Λ0 = x˜n −QΛ0(x˜n).
We use d˜n as a helper data. As in Figure 2, for the decoder
block with input y˜n, helper data d˜n, and output v˜n, we perform
v˜n = QΛ0([y˜
n − d˜n] mod Λ).
Since
y˜n = x˜n + z˜n = t˜n + d˜n + z˜n
where t˜n = QΛ0(x˜
n) ∈ Λ0, the decoder output is
v˜n = QΛ0([t˜
n + z˜n] mod Λ).
If we use nested lattices satisfying z˜n ∈ V(Λ0) with high
probability, it follows that
QΛ0([t˜
n + z˜n] mod Λ) = QΛ0(t˜
n)
with high probability. Since
QΛ0(t˜
n) = t˜n = QΛ0(x˜
n),
it also means that
QΛ0([y˜
n − d˜n] mod Λ) = QΛ0(x˜n)
with high probability. In other words, the helper data cancels
the effect of noise z˜n.
The lattice codebook is defined by the set Λ0 ∩ V(Λ). The
code rate is given by R = 1n log
(
V (Λ)
V (Λ0)
)
where V (·) is the
volume of the fundamental Voronoi region of a lattice. We use
nested lattices with parameters σ2(Λ) = P , G(Λ) = 12pie , and
V (Λ) = (2pieP )
n
2 . Nested lattices good for Gaussian channel
coding [14] can be used to achieve a rate up to R = 12 log
(
P
N
)
with vanishing error probability. In practice, polar lattices [12],
[13] can be used for polynomial-time processing.
IV. COMPARISONS WITH EXISTING METHODS
There are several existing method proposed for the GS
model.
The authors et al. [9] establish the connection between
Wyner-Ziv problem and the GS model. They describe the key-
leakage-storage region for GS model. However, for GS model,
according to the definitions, storage rate and privacy rate are
the same since I(Xn;W ) = H(W ) −H(W |Xn) = H(W ),
where W is a function of Xn in GS model. It is also reflected
in Theorem 1 in [9] as Rl and Rw have the same bound. So
the key-leakage-privacy region can be treated as key-leakage
region or key-storage region. We describe the optimal point of
the key-storage region by the algebraic binning argument. The
authors et al. [9] also show a polar code construction based
on the nested polar code in [10] to achieve the key-leakage-
storage region, which give the maximual key generation rate
as 1 − Hb(q ∗ p) for given PUF noise as a BSC(p), where
q ∈ [0, 0.5] is a chosen parameter for the first step vector
quantization (VQ) in the nested polar code. Since Hb(q ∗p) ≥
Hb(p), we have our optimal rate greater than their optimal rate
1−Hb(p) ≥ 1−Hb(q∗p), and the storage Hb(p) ≤ Hb(q∗p).
Notice that the both equalities can be achieved if q = 0, but
at this point they lose the nested polar code construction. The
reason for the degradation in their result is that there exists a
gap between Wyner-Ziv problem having distortion (reflected as
the first step VQ in the nested polar code construction) and the
GS model requiring an exact recovery of the key. So the VQ
step introducing the distortion is not necessary for GS model.
In all, we offer a better rate with a simpler implementation.
The authors et al. [11] offer an LDPC based scheme for
PUF. Their scheme does not optimize the key generation rate
since the LDPC does not necessarily form a coset partition.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We simulate the system in Figure 2 with the polar code
construction in Section III-C with MATLAB. If we use PUFs
in a field programmable gate array (FPGA) as the randomness
source, we must satisfy a block error probability PB of at
most 10−6 [16]. Consider a BSC(p) with crossover probability
p = 0.15, which is a common value for SRAM PUFs.
First, we consider the block length N = 1024 and we
design polar code with rate K/N = 128/1024 = 0.125 for
the BSC(p) channel. We evaluate the block error probability
performance of this code with SC decoder and SC list (SCL)
decoder with list size 8 respectively for a BSC with a range
of crossover probability, as shown in Figure. 3. It shows the
SCL decoder has better performance, and achieves a block
error probability of PB = 10−6 at a crossover probability
0.2. For comparison, we achieve the key generation rate
0.125 with crossover probability and block error probability
(0.2, 10−6), better than the crossover probability and block
error probability tuple (0.1819, 10−6) in [9].
VI. CONCLUSION
By algebraic binning, we show that “good” coset partition
is needed to achieve the optimal key generation rate for PUFs.
Thus we offer a principle in general for PUF key generation
system design. And we design a polar code-based system for
PUFs that achieve better key generation rate than existing
methods. In future work, we will further study the “good”
code for unquantized PUFs.
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